>_ nexus-market-darknet.ink observation log

If the operator key is compromised

The whole verification scheme rests on one private key staying private. It is worth thinking about what happens if it does not, before rather than during.

What compromise would mean

Somebody other than the operator could sign announcements that verify perfectly against the key you hold. Verification would keep saying good signature, because the signature would be good. The mathematics has no opinion about who is holding the key.

How it would surface

Why a revocation is signed with the key being revoked

Because only the holder can produce it, which is what makes it credible. A revocation announced any other way is a claim rather than a proof, and claims are what an attacker would also make.

What a reader can conclude

Less than they would like. From outside, a compromised key and a healthy one are indistinguishable until something inconsistent appears. This is a genuine limit of the scheme rather than an implementation flaw, and pretending otherwise would be dishonest.

What still helps

Continuity. A key that has signed every announcement for years, holding a fingerprint you recorded independently before today, is far better evidence than a key introduced this week. It is not proof and it is the best available.

The behaviour that survives all of this

Keeping a saved address list and not going hunting during an outage. That habit does not depend on any key remaining secure, which is why it remains the single most useful thing on this site.

What to do the day it is unclear

Stop using addresses from announcements and fall back to whatever you already held and have used successfully. Ambiguity is not a reason to accept new strings from unfamiliar places, it is a reason to accept none at all until the situation resolves. Waiting has never cost anybody an account.

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